Starting Wednesday the 28th of September I will begin taking a class at the University of Washington (along with other classes) which is entitled the Philosophy of Human Rights. This is an introductory class that will involve reading a reader (a "reader" is a book which contains various essays, articles and portions of longer works such as treatises on given subtopics that comprise a larger topic, such as Human Rights, Ethics, or Epistemology) The Philosophy of Human Rights edited by Patrick Hayden. This book seems to be fairly decent as a text, although some of the snippets of Locke and Hobbes are a bit too short.
The text, however, is not what I am here to talk about. Instead I would like to put forth a few thoughts concerning the issue of human rights and perhaps a tentative thesis on where my thoughts currently are. Throughout the duration of the course I hope to summarize various portions of the text here for purposes of reflection and organization of my thoughts, though they will certainly be primitive.
To begin, I would like to start with my tentative statement that it appears as though human beings do not actually have rights. One of the primary reasons I hold this belief is that I have yet to find a place in the Bible where human rights are emphasized or even acknowledged. Given that I consider the Bible to be inspired (in some way) and as such a truthful historical account of the interaction between God and humanity, I take that it is an authoritative source on providing accurate information of how humans can relate to God. In this relationship it appears as though human beings are told very little in the Bible of what they deserve and are instead called to belief in God, obedience to whatever system they have received from Him (whether it be the Mosaic law, or circumcision, or a growth a development of our relationship with God through Christ and with other people), and to recognize or moral responsibilities. It is hard to justify a reading of the importance of human rights in the Bible when God chose to let the Israelites be subject to Egyptian captivity and slavery for 400 years.
This having been said, I am still open to the idea that human rights exist, at least in some form. In fact, it is precisely here where I would begin my inquiry into human rights; that is, by asking the questions: What is a “right” and why should I think that human beings have them? I do not necessarily see any problem in answering these questions by saying that human rights do not actually exist but they are a useful fiction, yet if we are to do this then I think it is important for us to at least acknowledge this to be the case. In other words, if it is not true that human rights exist, yet we are going to say they do anyway, then it would be critical for us to be honest about this so as to not delude ourselves about the true nature of human beings in relationship to each other and their environment.
Besides the (seeming) lack of important placed on human rights in the Bible, another reason I have difficulty in believing that they exist is that I have never heard or read an adequate answer to either of the two questions posed above with a justification for why the answer is true (but perhaps I will as a result of the class I am taking). Hence someone might respond to them by saying something like, “Humans have rights because they have inherent value,” and I would then ask why our having value means that we have rights. I might give the counterexample of saying that pleasure has inherent value, but that it would be difficult to assign a right to a rather immaterial or “abstract” concept such as pleasure. It could potentially have inherent value because pleasure can be pursued for no other reason than the sake of pleasure (in other words, its value is derived from itself and not other things, thus making it inherent), and this would demonstrate that it does not follow from something having inherent value that it necessarily has rights. This is only one example, as I read more theories on human rights I will be able to contribute more thoughts on the difficulty with conceptual analysis and human rights (with defining the terms used in theories of human rights). It is also possible that pleasure does not have inherent value and my counterexample does not work, but it was mainly intended to illustrate a difficulty in defining human rights rather than to be a philosophically rigorous statement.
Another difficulty I have (and this is related to the objection above) is with the way in which Americans seem to be discovering new rights on a rather frequent basis. 2000 years ago it was not likely considered a right for women to have abortions, for all people to vote, for citizens to have healthcare, or for people to live on the streets of a city if they do not desire to have any house of their own. Today many different groups are either contending that these rights do exist, or that they do not. My problem with these contentions is the idea that we are suddenly discovering these “rights” to exist, yet I have to ask where they have been all this time and how we are now able to know that they are there. If someone wants to claim that the right to an abortion has always existed but that we have not recognized until very recently, I would like to know under which rock it was hiding when we found it, and why – if it did in fact exist – we did not see it earlier. Many people treat rights as though they are the legitimate discovery of the extension of the inherent value of human beings (i.e. the fact that I am a male human being - non-criminal - over the age of 18 and an American citizen gives me a right to vote), yet I do not see how so many rights that range over so many issues can be rationally justified by either empirical or a priori support.
All this having been said, I will still attempt to remain open to any sound ideas and arguments around the issue of human rights.
Monday, September 26, 2005
Saturday, July 30, 2005
Reflections on Learning Greek
About a year ago I embarked upon a study of Koine Greek – the language that the New Testament was written in – which has brought me full circle to where I am not only learning Greek, but also am teaching it. A friend of mine was gracious enough to teach me the language (he having had a formal education in it, whereas mine would be on my own and through no school system), and we went through William D. Mounce’s The Basics of Biblical Greek at the rate of around 1.5 chapters per week, finishing the book in about nine months. Now that I have completed my first year and am ready to start second year, I have found myself a few students wishing to learn Koine so that I am now in the position of passing on information as my friend once was (and still is, actually).
Two weeks ago these fledgling Greek learners and I sat down to our first lesson and went over our motivations for learning the language. I thought that it would be important for them to have a solid and memorable foundation upon which their edification could be built so that it does not crumble under the strain of hours of Greek study. Towards this end I prepared a short list of reasons that I had come up with in the space of about an hour, and then I shared it with them. The conversation went well and I am very optimistic about the potential I see for an opportunity to bring alone fellow Christians and help them mature in the faith. What follows below is an elaboration upon my preliminary reflections in an attempt to solidify my own intentions in learning Koine Greek.
Before continuing on, however, I would like to place a special emphasis on the fact that I am not trying to say that Greek should be mandatory for all Christians nor even that it always necessary or helpful. I can imagine that it is possible for some particular individual to be unfortunately in the situation where learning Greek would hinder them so greatly that it could be to their disadvantage, and certainly I would not want them to pursue self-degradation. Nonetheless, here I will attempt to put forth a list of positive reasons for why a person who has the opportunity and time to learn Greek would see sufficient reason to do so (not necessarily strongly desiring to, but seeing good reason to).
1) Greek is a new way to study the Bible.
If studying the N.T. is a good thing, then Greek gives us another way to read it. But more to the point, it in fact gives us a more accurate way to read it. It is the closest thing to being there in the first century and dialoguing with the N.T. writers that we have. I often find that reading the N.T. in Spanish can help me to see a familiar passage in a new light (I have had roughly two years of college Spanish, and have been speaking it for three years). Imagine how much more insightful it would be to read the N.T. in the actual language of the writers and to bypass the need for a translation. It truly opens up the goldmine of metaphors, wordplays, and etymological history that are lost in translation.
2) Greek is for teaching Scripture.
Given that the significance of a certain passage of Scripture is dependent entirely upon the correct interpretation of the original text, then familiarity with the original is certainly a better way to interpret then familiarity with a translation. I will not in any way even suggest that Greek be mandatory for all Christians, but I would certainly come close to saying that it should be mandatory for all teachers of Scripture who have access to it.
3) There are so many good Greek resources out there.
In a country where we have the opportunity to research and learn so much about the Bible, why would we hold ourselves back from doing so? Again, I am not here suggesting that Greek is for everyone. Obviously some peopled do not have time for it, and others can serve God as He desires without a knowledge of Greek. However, the virtual universality of resources for learning Biblical Greek (William D. Mounce’s book The Basics of Biblical Greek can be found at my local library) certainly makes it a practical option for anyone interested in furthering their understanding of the New Testament. This is a very rare opportunity.
4) To fill our minds with instructive, useful, and vitally relevant information.
In the culture we live in, it is far too easy for one to fill their mind with volumes of meaningless and pointless information absorbed from sources like television, magazines, and other people (Christians, non-Christians, friends, etc., basically anyone). Why not take the time to fill our minds with something that is inherently good to know? Why not saturate ourselves with knowledge and information that we can dwell on, rather than have to fight against? We need positive support and teaching of the correct application of our mental faculties. Constantly combating the negative messages which we receive every day can take its toll on our strength and commitment to God. Reading Greek and discovering the various insights (and interesting wordplays) which are lost in translation can be a source of renewal and edification for the studious believer.
5) It is a step towards a greater commitment to God for those who can do it.
If our goal as Christians is not to remain immature in our love of God, then we must be instructed in all wisdom and admonishment, and a more critical look at the text of the N.T. is a step towards a greater desire to know what God has communicated to His people through His apostles and prophets. I could go on about this point, but I think that it would hinder the essence of what I am trying to say. Basically all I mean to state with this particular observation is that Greek is almost a certain way for a believer to take that next step toward a greater commitment to God through a commitment to knowing His Scriptures.
6) It is a gateway to another world of discussion with Christian believers.
If we remain at a basic and fundamental understanding of Christianity and its truth claims, then how do we expect to build each other up and stimulate personal development? A person can only sit and listen to a message so many times before it becomes monotonous and without impact on their life, so reiterating a surface-level understanding of the Bible to yourself again and again fails to gauge the depth of what is contained within it, and the power it has to change a person's life. In order that we become Christians who are brought-to-the-end (teleoi, translated as “perfect” in the N.T.) for which Christ labors in us, it would be extremely beneficial for us to form a community of thoughtful and well-balanced individuals. This seems a much better formula for discovering the truth of God’s revelation than reading the Bible purely as a devotional document and expecting God to open our minds to profound truth with a bypass of our mental faculties in an intense emotional experience.
With all that I have said above, I would like to reiterate that I am not attempting to imply that everyone should be learning Greek, or even that the majority of Christians should (maybe I would prefer it that way, but God knows better than I and certainly His plans could be different). Instead what I am trying to do is set forth my own motivations for learning Greek or how I have chosen to look at it, and in the process provide the individual reader with some questions to ask himself about his desire/lack of a desire to learn Greek. In the end I am in no position to judge who should and who should not be learning Greek. So what I then ultimately recommend is prayer over the issue if you are pondering this or any other significant investment of your time towards God’s kingdom. I don’t know exactly what you should pray, but I always start with being as honest as I can, and then follow with the appropriate kind of imploring or petition to God. If you really believe that He is good, and really do believe that He cares about you, then I see no reason not to trust that He will provide a way for you to find a place of belonging in His will – wherever that may be. Ultimately I would say that this is the more critical step towards deciding whether or not Greek is for you than evaluating any of the reasons I have given above.
Two weeks ago these fledgling Greek learners and I sat down to our first lesson and went over our motivations for learning the language. I thought that it would be important for them to have a solid and memorable foundation upon which their edification could be built so that it does not crumble under the strain of hours of Greek study. Towards this end I prepared a short list of reasons that I had come up with in the space of about an hour, and then I shared it with them. The conversation went well and I am very optimistic about the potential I see for an opportunity to bring alone fellow Christians and help them mature in the faith. What follows below is an elaboration upon my preliminary reflections in an attempt to solidify my own intentions in learning Koine Greek.
Before continuing on, however, I would like to place a special emphasis on the fact that I am not trying to say that Greek should be mandatory for all Christians nor even that it always necessary or helpful. I can imagine that it is possible for some particular individual to be unfortunately in the situation where learning Greek would hinder them so greatly that it could be to their disadvantage, and certainly I would not want them to pursue self-degradation. Nonetheless, here I will attempt to put forth a list of positive reasons for why a person who has the opportunity and time to learn Greek would see sufficient reason to do so (not necessarily strongly desiring to, but seeing good reason to).
1) Greek is a new way to study the Bible.
If studying the N.T. is a good thing, then Greek gives us another way to read it. But more to the point, it in fact gives us a more accurate way to read it. It is the closest thing to being there in the first century and dialoguing with the N.T. writers that we have. I often find that reading the N.T. in Spanish can help me to see a familiar passage in a new light (I have had roughly two years of college Spanish, and have been speaking it for three years). Imagine how much more insightful it would be to read the N.T. in the actual language of the writers and to bypass the need for a translation. It truly opens up the goldmine of metaphors, wordplays, and etymological history that are lost in translation.
2) Greek is for teaching Scripture.
Given that the significance of a certain passage of Scripture is dependent entirely upon the correct interpretation of the original text, then familiarity with the original is certainly a better way to interpret then familiarity with a translation. I will not in any way even suggest that Greek be mandatory for all Christians, but I would certainly come close to saying that it should be mandatory for all teachers of Scripture who have access to it.
3) There are so many good Greek resources out there.
In a country where we have the opportunity to research and learn so much about the Bible, why would we hold ourselves back from doing so? Again, I am not here suggesting that Greek is for everyone. Obviously some peopled do not have time for it, and others can serve God as He desires without a knowledge of Greek. However, the virtual universality of resources for learning Biblical Greek (William D. Mounce’s book The Basics of Biblical Greek can be found at my local library) certainly makes it a practical option for anyone interested in furthering their understanding of the New Testament. This is a very rare opportunity.
4) To fill our minds with instructive, useful, and vitally relevant information.
In the culture we live in, it is far too easy for one to fill their mind with volumes of meaningless and pointless information absorbed from sources like television, magazines, and other people (Christians, non-Christians, friends, etc., basically anyone). Why not take the time to fill our minds with something that is inherently good to know? Why not saturate ourselves with knowledge and information that we can dwell on, rather than have to fight against? We need positive support and teaching of the correct application of our mental faculties. Constantly combating the negative messages which we receive every day can take its toll on our strength and commitment to God. Reading Greek and discovering the various insights (and interesting wordplays) which are lost in translation can be a source of renewal and edification for the studious believer.
5) It is a step towards a greater commitment to God for those who can do it.
If our goal as Christians is not to remain immature in our love of God, then we must be instructed in all wisdom and admonishment, and a more critical look at the text of the N.T. is a step towards a greater desire to know what God has communicated to His people through His apostles and prophets. I could go on about this point, but I think that it would hinder the essence of what I am trying to say. Basically all I mean to state with this particular observation is that Greek is almost a certain way for a believer to take that next step toward a greater commitment to God through a commitment to knowing His Scriptures.
6) It is a gateway to another world of discussion with Christian believers.
If we remain at a basic and fundamental understanding of Christianity and its truth claims, then how do we expect to build each other up and stimulate personal development? A person can only sit and listen to a message so many times before it becomes monotonous and without impact on their life, so reiterating a surface-level understanding of the Bible to yourself again and again fails to gauge the depth of what is contained within it, and the power it has to change a person's life. In order that we become Christians who are brought-to-the-end (teleoi, translated as “perfect” in the N.T.) for which Christ labors in us, it would be extremely beneficial for us to form a community of thoughtful and well-balanced individuals. This seems a much better formula for discovering the truth of God’s revelation than reading the Bible purely as a devotional document and expecting God to open our minds to profound truth with a bypass of our mental faculties in an intense emotional experience.
With all that I have said above, I would like to reiterate that I am not attempting to imply that everyone should be learning Greek, or even that the majority of Christians should (maybe I would prefer it that way, but God knows better than I and certainly His plans could be different). Instead what I am trying to do is set forth my own motivations for learning Greek or how I have chosen to look at it, and in the process provide the individual reader with some questions to ask himself about his desire/lack of a desire to learn Greek. In the end I am in no position to judge who should and who should not be learning Greek. So what I then ultimately recommend is prayer over the issue if you are pondering this or any other significant investment of your time towards God’s kingdom. I don’t know exactly what you should pray, but I always start with being as honest as I can, and then follow with the appropriate kind of imploring or petition to God. If you really believe that He is good, and really do believe that He cares about you, then I see no reason not to trust that He will provide a way for you to find a place of belonging in His will – wherever that may be. Ultimately I would say that this is the more critical step towards deciding whether or not Greek is for you than evaluating any of the reasons I have given above.
Friday, June 10, 2005
Objective Value: Towards a Theory
Today I will offer a brief synopsis of an argument advanced by Stuart C. Hackett in William Lane Craig’s reader on Philosophy of Religion. His argument can be found on pages 149-154 and it is entitled “The Value Dimension of The Cosmos: A Moral Argument.” Then I will expand upon it and offer my own insights, for better or worse.
The essential thesis of Hackett’s argument can be stated as follows: “…Persons, merely as such and just on account of their personhood, possess intrinsic value or worth. What this means is that persons are not to be construed as merely means or instruments of further ends, but rather as ends in themselves,” (pp. 149). By “ends” he means the goal of doing something. Looked at another way, doing something for a person – i.e. your friend, spouse, parent, etc. – has worth in virtue of the fact that it is being done for them, and no further appeal or justification is necessary to explain why the deed has worth. So you would not need to say, “I am doing this for my mother, which has value because doing so for her will make the economy grow, which is an inherently good thing to do.” Instead, a person (one’s mother, in this example) has inherent worth; therefore they are the reason for why things are done, not the means for achieving further ends.
Now, Hackett goes on to make an interesting observation as an extrapolation of this contention, “…In aiming at significant goals, a person implicitly accepts his own intrinsic worth and that of other persons as the rational basis of the worth of his choice, so that those goals themselves are judged appropriate, in the final analysis, because they are extrinsic means for actualizing the intrinsic worth of persons,” (pp. 150). Hackett later goes on to attempt to ground the worth of persons in the existence of a being of ultimate value – or God.
In this first portion of the article, the main point that Hackett attempts to communicate is that persons have intrinsic worth – as I have stated. He states that this is a rather unsurprising assertion in the commonsensical framework of everyday life, but that nonetheless there are those that would challenge it. Towards defending this supposition, he offers the above statements amongst a paragraph or two elaborating the idea that human beings involved in making choices presupposes the idea of either (a) a basis for intrinsic worth existing somewhere or (b) that, if such a basis does not exist, then choice making becomes absurd. I will now offer an elaboration on what I understand him to be saying and a potential defense of this position in the face of claims to the contrary.
In the ordinary event of making a decision it is not uncommon for the average person to engage in the simple process of what I will call value reductionism. The term “reductionism” I am borrowing from the more familiar sense of reductionism in which one attempts to reduce one thing to another, such as reducing the mind to the brain, or reducing morality to evolutionary processes and survival. In the sense that I wish to use it, a person engages in value reductionism when they go through a list of reasons or motivations for making a particular decision. An example of this would be the typical college student whose decision to attend a University is justified according to a reduction of the value of his decision to an ultimate ground of worth:
I will to college.
Why?
Because I want an education.
Why?
Because I want a decent job.
Why?
To support myself and my family.
Why do that?
Because my family is worth the effort and I do not want to burden others by forcing them to support me.
Why?
I do not need a reason to justify these as ends because they have intrinsic worth.
Now, the brief exercise that I have just run through is probably not the normal experience for a college student, because they usually have a myriad of reasons for attending school and few of them are thought out in such a linear fashion. Nonetheless, the point of making such a list is to demonstrate that the reaching of a final end of intrinsic worth – that is, basically a stopping point – makes the idea of choice much more coherent than if one does not suppose that such a stopping point exists. In other words, if there were no point at which one could stop the perpetual “Why?” by simply answering “Because it has inherent worth,” then the list of reasons for doing anything would continue on ad infinitum (to infinity, without end). On this hypothesis, no one actually knows why they do anything, which means that making a decision based upon emotion or impulse is all that one is left with. Furthermore, the idea that certain decisions are “better” than others becomes an incoherent concept, because no decision is directed towards grounds of inherent worth or less worth. And, finally, if someone says that a list of infinite reasons for doing something is what justifies making a decision, then two conclusions follow: (1) any decision to do anything is justified and (2) the person has actually contradicted themselves, because to assume an infinite list to be a justification for making a decision is to assume it has intrinsic value, which is precisely what the existence of the list is supposed to deny.
Given all of this, Hackett does not do so well in arguing that persons are the items which we should label as having intrinsic worth. He does say that persons act towards ends, which must presuppose themselves or someone else to have intrinsic worth, but there are numerous people that would either balk at this notion all together, or otherwise claim that it is difficult to support considering that most people do not structure their thinking along such lines. This observation would lead them to claim that people do not really know why they do most things, therefore one is question begging to say that people act as they do because persons have intrinsic worth. While these points can be acknowledged, it is difficult to outright deny Hackett’s point that, “…Any other proposed candidates for the status of intrinsic worth…turn out to be patently ridiculous on analysis – the pursuit for example, of power, wealth, knowledge, pleasure, or even health – all these ends are so obviously instrumental means to the well-being of persons as selves that any supposition that they are themselves intrinsically valuable becomes virtually ludicrous…” (pp. 150).
So Hackett’s argument and my own extrapolations can be summarized as follows, along with a final comment. Persons in virtue of their personhood have inherent worth. What I mean by “worth” is that something is either (a) an end in and of itself or (b) a means to an end. Persons have intrinsic worth because no reason needs to be given for why someone should do something beneficial to a person. That persons act towards anything as either an intrinsic end or an instrumental end implies that intrinsic ends exist because if they did not then decision making would be incoherent, which it does not seem to be. The fact that some people do not recognize the intrinsic worth of persons is not an argument against this being true, and that one cannot offer an argument for why persons themselves have intrinsic worth does not render the claim indemonstrable. It is possible that the value of persons must not be argued for but rather perceived, just as one could not argue a colorblind person into believing in the color blue without trusting the testimony of others. Furthermore, to argue that persons have intrinsic worth is to presuppose the worth of argumentation and logic, which would need just as reasonable a justification before one should believe in it. And, obviously this justification could not be based in logic because then one would be using logic to prove the value of logic, which is circular reasoning. Therefore it is possible that the worth of persons is inarguable without being, in any sense of the word, less real.
The essential thesis of Hackett’s argument can be stated as follows: “…Persons, merely as such and just on account of their personhood, possess intrinsic value or worth. What this means is that persons are not to be construed as merely means or instruments of further ends, but rather as ends in themselves,” (pp. 149). By “ends” he means the goal of doing something. Looked at another way, doing something for a person – i.e. your friend, spouse, parent, etc. – has worth in virtue of the fact that it is being done for them, and no further appeal or justification is necessary to explain why the deed has worth. So you would not need to say, “I am doing this for my mother, which has value because doing so for her will make the economy grow, which is an inherently good thing to do.” Instead, a person (one’s mother, in this example) has inherent worth; therefore they are the reason for why things are done, not the means for achieving further ends.
Now, Hackett goes on to make an interesting observation as an extrapolation of this contention, “…In aiming at significant goals, a person implicitly accepts his own intrinsic worth and that of other persons as the rational basis of the worth of his choice, so that those goals themselves are judged appropriate, in the final analysis, because they are extrinsic means for actualizing the intrinsic worth of persons,” (pp. 150). Hackett later goes on to attempt to ground the worth of persons in the existence of a being of ultimate value – or God.
In this first portion of the article, the main point that Hackett attempts to communicate is that persons have intrinsic worth – as I have stated. He states that this is a rather unsurprising assertion in the commonsensical framework of everyday life, but that nonetheless there are those that would challenge it. Towards defending this supposition, he offers the above statements amongst a paragraph or two elaborating the idea that human beings involved in making choices presupposes the idea of either (a) a basis for intrinsic worth existing somewhere or (b) that, if such a basis does not exist, then choice making becomes absurd. I will now offer an elaboration on what I understand him to be saying and a potential defense of this position in the face of claims to the contrary.
In the ordinary event of making a decision it is not uncommon for the average person to engage in the simple process of what I will call value reductionism. The term “reductionism” I am borrowing from the more familiar sense of reductionism in which one attempts to reduce one thing to another, such as reducing the mind to the brain, or reducing morality to evolutionary processes and survival. In the sense that I wish to use it, a person engages in value reductionism when they go through a list of reasons or motivations for making a particular decision. An example of this would be the typical college student whose decision to attend a University is justified according to a reduction of the value of his decision to an ultimate ground of worth:
I will to college.
Why?
Because I want an education.
Why?
Because I want a decent job.
Why?
To support myself and my family.
Why do that?
Because my family is worth the effort and I do not want to burden others by forcing them to support me.
Why?
I do not need a reason to justify these as ends because they have intrinsic worth.
Now, the brief exercise that I have just run through is probably not the normal experience for a college student, because they usually have a myriad of reasons for attending school and few of them are thought out in such a linear fashion. Nonetheless, the point of making such a list is to demonstrate that the reaching of a final end of intrinsic worth – that is, basically a stopping point – makes the idea of choice much more coherent than if one does not suppose that such a stopping point exists. In other words, if there were no point at which one could stop the perpetual “Why?” by simply answering “Because it has inherent worth,” then the list of reasons for doing anything would continue on ad infinitum (to infinity, without end). On this hypothesis, no one actually knows why they do anything, which means that making a decision based upon emotion or impulse is all that one is left with. Furthermore, the idea that certain decisions are “better” than others becomes an incoherent concept, because no decision is directed towards grounds of inherent worth or less worth. And, finally, if someone says that a list of infinite reasons for doing something is what justifies making a decision, then two conclusions follow: (1) any decision to do anything is justified and (2) the person has actually contradicted themselves, because to assume an infinite list to be a justification for making a decision is to assume it has intrinsic value, which is precisely what the existence of the list is supposed to deny.
Given all of this, Hackett does not do so well in arguing that persons are the items which we should label as having intrinsic worth. He does say that persons act towards ends, which must presuppose themselves or someone else to have intrinsic worth, but there are numerous people that would either balk at this notion all together, or otherwise claim that it is difficult to support considering that most people do not structure their thinking along such lines. This observation would lead them to claim that people do not really know why they do most things, therefore one is question begging to say that people act as they do because persons have intrinsic worth. While these points can be acknowledged, it is difficult to outright deny Hackett’s point that, “…Any other proposed candidates for the status of intrinsic worth…turn out to be patently ridiculous on analysis – the pursuit for example, of power, wealth, knowledge, pleasure, or even health – all these ends are so obviously instrumental means to the well-being of persons as selves that any supposition that they are themselves intrinsically valuable becomes virtually ludicrous…” (pp. 150).
So Hackett’s argument and my own extrapolations can be summarized as follows, along with a final comment. Persons in virtue of their personhood have inherent worth. What I mean by “worth” is that something is either (a) an end in and of itself or (b) a means to an end. Persons have intrinsic worth because no reason needs to be given for why someone should do something beneficial to a person. That persons act towards anything as either an intrinsic end or an instrumental end implies that intrinsic ends exist because if they did not then decision making would be incoherent, which it does not seem to be. The fact that some people do not recognize the intrinsic worth of persons is not an argument against this being true, and that one cannot offer an argument for why persons themselves have intrinsic worth does not render the claim indemonstrable. It is possible that the value of persons must not be argued for but rather perceived, just as one could not argue a colorblind person into believing in the color blue without trusting the testimony of others. Furthermore, to argue that persons have intrinsic worth is to presuppose the worth of argumentation and logic, which would need just as reasonable a justification before one should believe in it. And, obviously this justification could not be based in logic because then one would be using logic to prove the value of logic, which is circular reasoning. Therefore it is possible that the worth of persons is inarguable without being, in any sense of the word, less real.
Friday, June 03, 2005
The Impractical Value of The Bible
I must start off this piece by first acknowledging that there is much practical value to the Bible. It might seem rather odd that the opening content of an article would go contrary to its title, but since the title of this particular blog does not imply that its opposite is untrue – that is, that it is untrue that the Bible has practical value – I thought it would be important to point this out. Indeed, by virtue of the fact that the Bible is true and provides reliable information about the only way to God makes it very practical. However, the Bible is certainly not an instruction booklet for life (for Christians), and the history of its composition certain bespeaks of this truth when one considers that it is a collection of scrolls, histories, books of legislation, poetry, wisdom literature, tracts, letters, and prophetic revelations written over the course of a few thousand years (1500 to be more precise). To lump all of these various types of writing together under a single heading such as “The Bible” and to read it as a “book” certainly would not be the most accurate way to understand the nature and purpose of the Bible.
Having said this much, the reader should know that it is a necessary introduction to a rather controversial point which I am about to make. And instead of taking awhile to reach the substance of this blog, I will state it as tersely as possible right now.
For one reason or another many Christians that I interact with have a strange approach to studying the Bible. They seem to search each section of Scripture and look for the “practical” value in everything they read. I find them scouring through every book of the Bible as if it were an instruction pamphlet on how to deal with a particular challenge in this life. Furthermore, every time I want to stop and take things slowly, to perhaps ponder over a verse and consider various interpretations and what impact they would have on the overall authorial meaning, people are reluctant and they immediately prefer “practicality.” “If it isn’t practical, then what is the point in knowing it?” they say. Rarely am I ever afforded the opportunity to discuss with someone the broader theological or philosophical implications of a particular passage of Scripture.
While reflecting upon this attitude I came to a certain realization – and perhaps the credit is not due to myself because I had never thought of this idea before – of precisely why this is a naive and incorrect approach to reading the Bible. The question basically came to my mind like this: Why does everything that we learn about the Bible have to be “practical” and “applicable”? Why do I have to be able to read a portion of Scripture and extract a set of guidelines or rules for life? Why cannot one simply be content with learning a truth about our world, or about the historical figures in the Bible text, or the historical situations in which the Bible was written, instead of having to see how it relates to their life?
Here is my main observation: so much information that people consume readily is very impractical, inapplicable junk. They play video games, absorb pop culture, watch fashion trends, read magazines, watch movies, watch sports, and then talk about it with their friends despite the fact that all of this information has no practical value. I can’t create a “guide” for life by watching Star Wars, or playing Grand Theft Auto 3, or listening to classical music, or talking about the Raiders, etc., on and on the list goes! So why in the world would anyone be resistant to learning non-practical information about the Bible? It simply makes no sense.
What makes the situation worse is that information regarding the Bible has value regardless of its practicality, yet people will flee from a challenging investigation of the Biblical text. It is as if Christianity either has to be practical or it is not worth knowing, and this is simply wrong. If people begin to examine the other areas of their life they will realize how much useless information they absorb that is also very impractical, and hopefully they will see that filling their minds with “impractical” knowledge regarding God, theology, and Christian truth is much more important. Ultimately, I believe, it will also be more practical in the end because it will allow them to understand their beliefs better, to communicate them to others in a coherent way, and to have a sincere dedication to something that they have taken the time to investigate.
All this having been said, there is of course this possible objection: “But having information about the pop culture will allow me to talk to other people, which might give me a chance to share the Gospel. If I don’t know anything about other people’s interests then how can I relate to them?”
To this I respond by saying that it is in no way a bad thing to be knowledgeable enough about the popular culture so that one is able to talk to others. However, the observation that I make is a situation which Christians can have in-depth discussions of popular culture while maintaining just barely enough knowledge of the Bible to attend church and not be overwhelmed by a few Bible references. The truth of the matter seems to be that the situation ought to be reversed: Christians ought to know just enough of the popular culture to not be ignorant, but should be filled with information about the Bible that is beyond what they think they “need” to know. Since most of us are already filled with information about various subjects which we in no way “need” to know, why not replace our time spent absorbing such things with time spent reading four and five commentaries on a single book of the N.T.? I understand that this requires much work and might not be very “practical,” but neither is any of that other information, and this seems to be more important.
So the observations which I have made this far could be constructed as a tentative argument that it is better for Christians to be filled with impractical knowledge of the Bible, theology, philosophy, apologetics, history, etc., than just about anything else. It is not merely a defense of practicing such study habits, however, because I see it more like a call to action on the part of Christians who lack a rich knowledge of Scripture. If our lives must be spent absorbing some kind of information, then why not let this be what our minds dwell on? And why not push ourselves to be exerting our mentally faculties in an area of our lives which has vast treasuries of knowledge that concern truth?
I simply do not understand the attitude which is constantly forcing the Bible to be “practical.”
Having said this much, the reader should know that it is a necessary introduction to a rather controversial point which I am about to make. And instead of taking awhile to reach the substance of this blog, I will state it as tersely as possible right now.
For one reason or another many Christians that I interact with have a strange approach to studying the Bible. They seem to search each section of Scripture and look for the “practical” value in everything they read. I find them scouring through every book of the Bible as if it were an instruction pamphlet on how to deal with a particular challenge in this life. Furthermore, every time I want to stop and take things slowly, to perhaps ponder over a verse and consider various interpretations and what impact they would have on the overall authorial meaning, people are reluctant and they immediately prefer “practicality.” “If it isn’t practical, then what is the point in knowing it?” they say. Rarely am I ever afforded the opportunity to discuss with someone the broader theological or philosophical implications of a particular passage of Scripture.
While reflecting upon this attitude I came to a certain realization – and perhaps the credit is not due to myself because I had never thought of this idea before – of precisely why this is a naive and incorrect approach to reading the Bible. The question basically came to my mind like this: Why does everything that we learn about the Bible have to be “practical” and “applicable”? Why do I have to be able to read a portion of Scripture and extract a set of guidelines or rules for life? Why cannot one simply be content with learning a truth about our world, or about the historical figures in the Bible text, or the historical situations in which the Bible was written, instead of having to see how it relates to their life?
Here is my main observation: so much information that people consume readily is very impractical, inapplicable junk. They play video games, absorb pop culture, watch fashion trends, read magazines, watch movies, watch sports, and then talk about it with their friends despite the fact that all of this information has no practical value. I can’t create a “guide” for life by watching Star Wars, or playing Grand Theft Auto 3, or listening to classical music, or talking about the Raiders, etc., on and on the list goes! So why in the world would anyone be resistant to learning non-practical information about the Bible? It simply makes no sense.
What makes the situation worse is that information regarding the Bible has value regardless of its practicality, yet people will flee from a challenging investigation of the Biblical text. It is as if Christianity either has to be practical or it is not worth knowing, and this is simply wrong. If people begin to examine the other areas of their life they will realize how much useless information they absorb that is also very impractical, and hopefully they will see that filling their minds with “impractical” knowledge regarding God, theology, and Christian truth is much more important. Ultimately, I believe, it will also be more practical in the end because it will allow them to understand their beliefs better, to communicate them to others in a coherent way, and to have a sincere dedication to something that they have taken the time to investigate.
All this having been said, there is of course this possible objection: “But having information about the pop culture will allow me to talk to other people, which might give me a chance to share the Gospel. If I don’t know anything about other people’s interests then how can I relate to them?”
To this I respond by saying that it is in no way a bad thing to be knowledgeable enough about the popular culture so that one is able to talk to others. However, the observation that I make is a situation which Christians can have in-depth discussions of popular culture while maintaining just barely enough knowledge of the Bible to attend church and not be overwhelmed by a few Bible references. The truth of the matter seems to be that the situation ought to be reversed: Christians ought to know just enough of the popular culture to not be ignorant, but should be filled with information about the Bible that is beyond what they think they “need” to know. Since most of us are already filled with information about various subjects which we in no way “need” to know, why not replace our time spent absorbing such things with time spent reading four and five commentaries on a single book of the N.T.? I understand that this requires much work and might not be very “practical,” but neither is any of that other information, and this seems to be more important.
So the observations which I have made this far could be constructed as a tentative argument that it is better for Christians to be filled with impractical knowledge of the Bible, theology, philosophy, apologetics, history, etc., than just about anything else. It is not merely a defense of practicing such study habits, however, because I see it more like a call to action on the part of Christians who lack a rich knowledge of Scripture. If our lives must be spent absorbing some kind of information, then why not let this be what our minds dwell on? And why not push ourselves to be exerting our mentally faculties in an area of our lives which has vast treasuries of knowledge that concern truth?
I simply do not understand the attitude which is constantly forcing the Bible to be “practical.”
Wednesday, May 25, 2005
The Euthyphro Question
In just about any introductory philosophy class one is bound to encounter what is known as the "Euthyphro" question. The aptly titled quandary - or, it is at least assumed to be a quandary by some - comes from a short Platonic dialogue (meaning written by the Greek philosopher Plato) by the same name in which Socrates inquires of his interlocuting guest - Euthyphro, from Greek meaning "right thinking" or "Mr. Straight Thinking" according to Aryeh Kosman - a perplexing question. Euthyphro claims that a pious act is one that is loved by the gods, to which Socrates responds with the question: But is an act pious because it is god-loved, or is it god-loved because it is pious? In other words, are pious acts made pious by the gods, or do the gods merely observe actions which are pious and then label them as such?
Now, some people have attempted to bring this question over into a theistic setting and claim that this same objection can apply to belief in a single God (forgetting the historical context of a Greek culture - Athens - which believed in a pantheon of gods many, many gods). As this pertains to the problem of evil - my current study - I will offer a brief account of this objection and then a brief response. Precisely what the objection is supposed to be can become complex to explain, but it is mostly an attempted refutation of Divine Command Theory - that morality is a set of commands from God. While I do not necessarily advocate DCT, I think that it must be devalued based upon legitimate objections and not this one in particular from the Euthyphro dialogue which I believe to fall short of accomplishing its goal.
So here is the Euthyphro question applied to theism: Are right acts right because God commands them, or does God command them because they are right? I will assume that the distinction between these two concepts is clear enough that I do not need to explore the nature of actions and passions.
My brief response to the Euthyphro question is that it is quite possibly an incoherent charge to level at theism. To begin, if God has existed from eternity (as is the theistic hypothesis), then certain moral facts have also - in a semi-Platonic sense - existed from eternity with Him; allow me to give an example. If we suppose that God is all that exists, that He has not yet created anything, then let us ask a question: If God were to create a Universe exactly like ours, and then command His creatures to torture innocent babies for fun, would this be wrong on God's part? I think that if we can assume it to be true that torturing babies for fun is wrong, then we can say that it is true that in a Universe like ours then torturing babies is wrong as a means of logical consequence (even for God). This is tantamount to saying that in a Universe like ours atoms are smaller than molecules. It is simply the way that things must work given the structure of existence. Hence, because certain observations we have made like these would be true as hypothetical statements even if our Universe did not exist, then it is possible that true statements about moral dilemmas exist as necessary and contingent truths which are dependent upon God to actualize certain Universes in order for the moral dilemmas to exist. So it would be true to say that if God created a Universe exactly like ours then it would be wrong for a person to torture innocent babies in that Universe, even though that Universe does not exist. The non-existence of that Universe, however, does not negate the truth of the hypothetical statement. This is equivalent to saying that in every possible Universe bachelors are unmarried males, because it is inconceivable that there is a possible Universe in which bachelors are married. Now, we have seen that it is possible for true statements about morality to exist without the actual instantiations of the moral situations themselves being realized.
The next thing to do is argue that the nature of morality - that is, why it would be hypothetically wrong to torture babies in a Universe exactly like ours - depends upon God. That is, in order to defend the claim that morality is both dependent upon God and not His arbitrary commandment, one needs to first demonstrate that morality is not arbitrary - it has perhaps become necessarily true as I have stated it - and then that things are still moral or immoral because of how they relate to God. This argument follows logically - I think - from the claim that it is possible for necessarily true statements about morality to exist. That is, if there are such things as necessarily true statements about morality then what else could we appeal to except God for explaining why they are necessarily true? If nothing else exists except God, then how can they be dependent upon anything else?
In any event, there are still problems with what I have written here which I will not explore, but I think the fact that on the hypothesis of theism that moral truths potentially exist eternally with God is at least one response to the Euthyphro question.
Now, some people have attempted to bring this question over into a theistic setting and claim that this same objection can apply to belief in a single God (forgetting the historical context of a Greek culture - Athens - which believed in a pantheon of gods many, many gods). As this pertains to the problem of evil - my current study - I will offer a brief account of this objection and then a brief response. Precisely what the objection is supposed to be can become complex to explain, but it is mostly an attempted refutation of Divine Command Theory - that morality is a set of commands from God. While I do not necessarily advocate DCT, I think that it must be devalued based upon legitimate objections and not this one in particular from the Euthyphro dialogue which I believe to fall short of accomplishing its goal.
So here is the Euthyphro question applied to theism: Are right acts right because God commands them, or does God command them because they are right? I will assume that the distinction between these two concepts is clear enough that I do not need to explore the nature of actions and passions.
My brief response to the Euthyphro question is that it is quite possibly an incoherent charge to level at theism. To begin, if God has existed from eternity (as is the theistic hypothesis), then certain moral facts have also - in a semi-Platonic sense - existed from eternity with Him; allow me to give an example. If we suppose that God is all that exists, that He has not yet created anything, then let us ask a question: If God were to create a Universe exactly like ours, and then command His creatures to torture innocent babies for fun, would this be wrong on God's part? I think that if we can assume it to be true that torturing babies for fun is wrong, then we can say that it is true that in a Universe like ours then torturing babies is wrong as a means of logical consequence (even for God). This is tantamount to saying that in a Universe like ours atoms are smaller than molecules. It is simply the way that things must work given the structure of existence. Hence, because certain observations we have made like these would be true as hypothetical statements even if our Universe did not exist, then it is possible that true statements about moral dilemmas exist as necessary and contingent truths which are dependent upon God to actualize certain Universes in order for the moral dilemmas to exist. So it would be true to say that if God created a Universe exactly like ours then it would be wrong for a person to torture innocent babies in that Universe, even though that Universe does not exist. The non-existence of that Universe, however, does not negate the truth of the hypothetical statement. This is equivalent to saying that in every possible Universe bachelors are unmarried males, because it is inconceivable that there is a possible Universe in which bachelors are married. Now, we have seen that it is possible for true statements about morality to exist without the actual instantiations of the moral situations themselves being realized.
The next thing to do is argue that the nature of morality - that is, why it would be hypothetically wrong to torture babies in a Universe exactly like ours - depends upon God. That is, in order to defend the claim that morality is both dependent upon God and not His arbitrary commandment, one needs to first demonstrate that morality is not arbitrary - it has perhaps become necessarily true as I have stated it - and then that things are still moral or immoral because of how they relate to God. This argument follows logically - I think - from the claim that it is possible for necessarily true statements about morality to exist. That is, if there are such things as necessarily true statements about morality then what else could we appeal to except God for explaining why they are necessarily true? If nothing else exists except God, then how can they be dependent upon anything else?
In any event, there are still problems with what I have written here which I will not explore, but I think the fact that on the hypothesis of theism that moral truths potentially exist eternally with God is at least one response to the Euthyphro question.
Friday, May 20, 2005
The Problem of Evil
This will be an introductory piece on the Problem of Evil as it is formulated to undermine the theistic belief in a God with these three characteristics: Omnipotence (all-powerful), Omniscience (all-knowing), Omni-benevolence (or morally perfect). This is sometimes called the Three-O, Tri-Omni, or O3 God. I am not mainly looking to expound the POE, its various formulations, and the contributions that have been made to it both historically and recently. Instead, I plan to use a brief introduction of the main ideas involved in the POE as a springboard for the putting forth of my own considerations.
The essential formulation of the POE can go something like this:
P1) God exists and has all three omni characteristics stated above.
P2) Evil exists.
P3) Something is wrong here.
To some degree all of those who are familiar with the claims of theism must also be familiar with the challenge that the existence of evil presents to those who believe theism to be an epistemically warranted belief (rational). If God truly is good, and truly is all-powerful, then why has he created a Universe in which suffering exists? This is the basic question, and the way that one then takes this objection and puts it into an argument can have many forms. Before a small book written by Alvin Plantinga (professor of philosophy at Notre Dame University) in the 1970s called God, Freedom, and Evil, many people apparently thought that they could demonstrate the existence of God to be logically incompatible with the existence of evil (understanding that by God I mean O3 Theism, and by evil I mean suffering of any kind as well as moral evil). They sought to show that the existence of God was logically impossible if evil also existed. Since Platinga’s significant contribution to discussions over the POE with this book, almost all philosophers have rejected the idea of logically disproving God’s existence. Instead they have focused on the probabilistic argument from evil, one which attempts to show that God’s existence is at least improbable given that evil exists. Again, most of these accounts have not been successful, if by success one means rationally persuasive. On the other hand, there is a certain emotional tug which probabilistic arguments from evil seem to exert upon the reader, especially when combined with particularly poignant examples of suffering or moral evil. They appeal to our understanding of what goodness is and what capability is, and make us consider whether or not we are still rational to believe that God exists.
Thus far I have not necessarily been attempting to elucidate many of the main areas of disagreement which surround the POE, such as formulations of probability theorem, what it means for something to be logically impossible, and the distinction between a theodicy and a defense. Instead I have been meaning to keep this piece still very much at the conceptual level because this is precisely where many of my own thoughts lie on the problem of evil. For right now the reader only needs to know the basic ideas which atheists and agonistics claim are inconsistent, that is, that a certain God exists and that he would allow evil to exist. In the future I will be posting to this blog my own thoughts as they are developed. I will be asking and exploring a question similar to this one: Are human beings epistemically warranted in claiming that God must have a reason for permitting evil to exist? What kinds of evil must he have a reason for, moral evil or suffering? What ramifications does drawing a distinction between these two kinds of “evil” have for the theist who wishes to offer a defense for God’s existence? Must God have a morally sufficient reason for permitting suffering, or for permitting moral evil?
These and more questions are those which will be explored in the near future. Stay tuned.
The essential formulation of the POE can go something like this:
P1) God exists and has all three omni characteristics stated above.
P2) Evil exists.
P3) Something is wrong here.
To some degree all of those who are familiar with the claims of theism must also be familiar with the challenge that the existence of evil presents to those who believe theism to be an epistemically warranted belief (rational). If God truly is good, and truly is all-powerful, then why has he created a Universe in which suffering exists? This is the basic question, and the way that one then takes this objection and puts it into an argument can have many forms. Before a small book written by Alvin Plantinga (professor of philosophy at Notre Dame University) in the 1970s called God, Freedom, and Evil, many people apparently thought that they could demonstrate the existence of God to be logically incompatible with the existence of evil (understanding that by God I mean O3 Theism, and by evil I mean suffering of any kind as well as moral evil). They sought to show that the existence of God was logically impossible if evil also existed. Since Platinga’s significant contribution to discussions over the POE with this book, almost all philosophers have rejected the idea of logically disproving God’s existence. Instead they have focused on the probabilistic argument from evil, one which attempts to show that God’s existence is at least improbable given that evil exists. Again, most of these accounts have not been successful, if by success one means rationally persuasive. On the other hand, there is a certain emotional tug which probabilistic arguments from evil seem to exert upon the reader, especially when combined with particularly poignant examples of suffering or moral evil. They appeal to our understanding of what goodness is and what capability is, and make us consider whether or not we are still rational to believe that God exists.
Thus far I have not necessarily been attempting to elucidate many of the main areas of disagreement which surround the POE, such as formulations of probability theorem, what it means for something to be logically impossible, and the distinction between a theodicy and a defense. Instead I have been meaning to keep this piece still very much at the conceptual level because this is precisely where many of my own thoughts lie on the problem of evil. For right now the reader only needs to know the basic ideas which atheists and agonistics claim are inconsistent, that is, that a certain God exists and that he would allow evil to exist. In the future I will be posting to this blog my own thoughts as they are developed. I will be asking and exploring a question similar to this one: Are human beings epistemically warranted in claiming that God must have a reason for permitting evil to exist? What kinds of evil must he have a reason for, moral evil or suffering? What ramifications does drawing a distinction between these two kinds of “evil” have for the theist who wishes to offer a defense for God’s existence? Must God have a morally sufficient reason for permitting suffering, or for permitting moral evil?
These and more questions are those which will be explored in the near future. Stay tuned.
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