Michael Martin's Argument from Evil

In the book The Problem of Evil, edited by Micheal L. Peterson (1992), there is an argument presented against the existence of God by philosopher Michael Martin. Here I will present Martin’s argument and a few responses.

Martin begins by saying that he will show how evil can be used as evidence against the existence of God, specifically in response to another philosopher who alleged that such had yet to be accomplished by the various atheistic arguments from evil (Pargetter in Mind, 1976),

The first concern that Martin has is to define the way in which evil conflicts with the existence of God. He says that we might think of evil as providing prima facie evidence of God. The definition of prima facie that he advances involves three variables: H = a given hypothesis, E = evidence, and A = relevant assumptions made. Thus, he says that, “E is prima facie evidence against H if E and H do not entail a contradiction and A and A do not entail a contradiction and E and H and A do entail a contradiction,” (136, emphasis added).

In his argument, then, Martin considers evil to be the evidence E, H to be the proposition “God exists,” and then he explores the relevant considerations that will constitute A, which are the relevant assumptions that one chooses to take into account.

The assumptions that Martin himself makes are given little defense, as he already assumes them to be proven. He states that if we consider the proposition, “The existence of evil in great abundance is not logically necessary and there is no sufficient reason for God to allow evil in great abundance,” (Ibid.) we will see that this is a relevant assumption which conflicts with our evidence and hypothesis (E and H). Therefore, we must consider that evil provides prima facie evidence against the existence of God. This is furthermore reinforced by the fact that the proposition “evil exists in great abundance” (E) does not contradict the proposition “God exists” (H), and that (E) does not contradict the assumption that evil is not logically necessary and that God has no sufficient reason for allowing it (A), yet when all these three are taken together (E, H, and A), a contradiction ensues. Thus the conditions for evil being prima facie evidence against the existence of God are satisfied.

Now the few important assumptions that Martin makes at this point are really the crux of the matter. First, he says that the existence of evil can only be justified if (a) evil is logically necessary or (b) there is some reason God has that justifies him in allowing the existence of evil. Second, he says that neither (a) nor (b) have been supplied by “Apologists” over the many years in which they have been attempting to do so.

Both of these assumptions are precisely the points of contention that theists and atheists have been arguing over for a very long time, so it is difficult to see what Martin accomplishes by putting his argument into this form. This is because all philosophers on either side of the issue (i.e. in favor of, or against, the argument from evil) acknowledge that the POE is, in fact, a problem when certain assumptions are granted, and it is precisely these assumptions that Martin gives himself! Therefore all he seems to actually accomplish is a restatement of the argument when the atheist is granted the premises that he wants. This is not a particularly poignant matter of contention as theists are willing to recognize what follows in this situation, and it is precisely for this reason that they take so strongly to opposing the argument from evil.

Hence on the grounds that Martin assumes rather than demonstrates the critical points of his argument it can be seen to fail. He gives us no reason to think that God is without sufficient reasons for allowing evil to exist in great abundance other than to rely upon his assessment of the results that centuries of argumentation have yielded. I would like to add, however, that even if I were to grant Martin this particular point (which I do not except for the sake of argument), he still can be said to have not made many hidden assumptions explicit, and that when he is challenged on these grounds then further possibilities for consider will need to be argued against before his case can be advanced.

The particular assumption of Martin’s that I have in mind is where he makes a statement along the lines of:
(A) For God to allow evil to exist it must be the case that either (1) evil is logically necessary or (2) God has a sufficient (moral) reason for allowing evil to exist.

Regarding this assumption, he says that possibilities (1) and (2) are exhaustive and that no other options exist that would allow God to permit the existence of evil. For the sake of argument I will grant Martin that (1) and (2) do not obtain (as this is what he grants himself), but it I want to argue that this fact does not entail the entire statement of (A). That is, (A) taken as a whole says that we must either deny God’s existence or evil’s existence, and most people would choose God over evil, at least if they wish to accept (A) and remain rational. In other words, I will disagree with Martin that (1) and (2) constitute the entire list of responses that Apologists can offer as explaining the existence of coexistence of evil and God. This will be done in an attempt to show that even the very biased nature of Martin’s argument does not yield the conclusion that he desires.

In response, then, I will challenge whether or not Martin’s list is exhaustive. To do this, I will propose the following possibility:
(B) There is no way of providing sufficient epistemic warrant for the claims that (3) God must balance evil with good, or (4) the amount evil in the world is not already balanced by good.

What (B) serves to do is provide an alternative that Martin has not considered on his list of possible explanations for the existence of evil given that God also exists. This possibility is that God does not need to have a good that outweighs the evil that exists in the world. (B4) basically renders irrelevant the claim that God must have a sufficient reason for allowing evil to exist by saying that there is no way of providing sufficient epistemic warrant for demonstrating such a claim. Thus, (B3) serves to expand Martin’s list and provide options that he has not considered, and (B4) serves to undermine the claim that the assumptions I gave Martin can be granted at all.

While I have not necessarily argued for either proposition (B3) or (B4), I think that taken together they are sufficient to suggest that even if all that Martin desires is granted him then he still has more work to do before his case can be fully made.