The Problem of Evil

This will be an introductory piece on the Problem of Evil as it is formulated to undermine the theistic belief in a God with these three characteristics: Omnipotence (all-powerful), Omniscience (all-knowing), Omni-benevolence (or morally perfect). This is sometimes called the Three-O, Tri-Omni, or O3 God. I am not mainly looking to expound the POE, its various formulations, and the contributions that have been made to it both historically and recently. Instead, I plan to use a brief introduction of the main ideas involved in the POE as a springboard for the putting forth of my own considerations.

The essential formulation of the POE can go something like this:

P1) God exists and has all three omni characteristics stated above.
P2) Evil exists.
P3) Something is wrong here.

To some degree all of those who are familiar with the claims of theism must also be familiar with the challenge that the existence of evil presents to those who believe theism to be an epistemically warranted belief (rational). If God truly is good, and truly is all-powerful, then why has he created a Universe in which suffering exists? This is the basic question, and the way that one then takes this objection and puts it into an argument can have many forms. Before a small book written by Alvin Plantinga (professor of philosophy at Notre Dame University) in the 1970s called God, Freedom, and Evil, many people apparently thought that they could demonstrate the existence of God to be logically incompatible with the existence of evil (understanding that by God I mean O3 Theism, and by evil I mean suffering of any kind as well as moral evil). They sought to show that the existence of God was logically impossible if evil also existed. Since Platinga’s significant contribution to discussions over the POE with this book, almost all philosophers have rejected the idea of logically disproving God’s existence. Instead they have focused on the probabilistic argument from evil, one which attempts to show that God’s existence is at least improbable given that evil exists. Again, most of these accounts have not been successful, if by success one means rationally persuasive. On the other hand, there is a certain emotional tug which probabilistic arguments from evil seem to exert upon the reader, especially when combined with particularly poignant examples of suffering or moral evil. They appeal to our understanding of what goodness is and what capability is, and make us consider whether or not we are still rational to believe that God exists.

Thus far I have not necessarily been attempting to elucidate many of the main areas of disagreement which surround the POE, such as formulations of probability theorem, what it means for something to be logically impossible, and the distinction between a theodicy and a defense. Instead I have been meaning to keep this piece still very much at the conceptual level because this is precisely where many of my own thoughts lie on the problem of evil. For right now the reader only needs to know the basic ideas which atheists and agonistics claim are inconsistent, that is, that a certain God exists and that he would allow evil to exist. In the future I will be posting to this blog my own thoughts as they are developed. I will be asking and exploring a question similar to this one: Are human beings epistemically warranted in claiming that God must have a reason for permitting evil to exist? What kinds of evil must he have a reason for, moral evil or suffering? What ramifications does drawing a distinction between these two kinds of “evil” have for the theist who wishes to offer a defense for God’s existence? Must God have a morally sufficient reason for permitting suffering, or for permitting moral evil?

These and more questions are those which will be explored in the near future. Stay tuned.